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Although Canada has developed an effective animal identification system, and the provinces
are progressing toward a system that has full traceback capabilities, the U.S. and Mexico have
made little or no progress. Contemporary U.S. proposals for state initiatives will not work. In
the meantime, the U.S. livestock industry will continue to lose markets for its products and
has little to no basis for complaining about lost sales and the lack of open markets. Also
indentified are relevant economic and political principles that both underlie animal identi-
fication systems and the failure to make positive steps forward toward establishing a North
American animal identification system.
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Explaining the differences in the evolution of an-
imal identification (ID) policy among the U.S.,
Canada, and Mexico involves an interesting mix
of economic, cultural, and political consider-
ations. Each of these considerations is discussed
in varying degrees in the articles by Anderson,
Ortega and Peel, and Carlberg. These discussion
comments are designed to coalesce the major
forces leading to a lack of consensus on the ap-
propriate trilateral policy to deal with the animal
ID issues related to and the related disease prob-
lems.Notaddressedaretheinvasivespecieorigins
of these disease problems, which could be the
subjectofanotherSAEAinterdisciplinarysession.
Economics
The economic considerations for each country
are much the same, although there appears to be
substantialasymmetryamongthecountriesasto
how well their consequences are realized, par-
ticularly at the cattle-raiser level. These eco-
nomicconsiderationsinvolvetrade,publicgood,
free rider, market failure, and second-best con-
siderations. Each of these considerations war-
rants comment in theory and in practice.
Trade
As pointed out by Carlberg, the aggressive Ca-
nadianresponsetotheBSEincidentwasheavily
motivated by the fact that their beef, pork, and
dairy industries are export-dependent. It is
generallyrecognizedthattheU.S.liveandmeat
markets are critically important for Canadian
beef and pork. Often missed by analysts is that
factthatCanadiandairyfarmersdependonU.S.
and Mexico for its sales of female dairy year-
lings and springers. This excess supply is a re-
sult of Canadian limits on milk production
(Knutson et al., 1997).
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failed to realize that Canadian animal ID policy
has put them at an absolute disadvantage in ex-
porting meat to important markets such as Ja-
pan and South Korea. U.S. opponents to animal
ID have put their Foreign Agriculture Service
(FAS)/USDA and U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR) negotiators in a very poor negotiating
position for opening markets and expanding
exports. USDA policymakers are at fault be-
cause, as expanded on subsequently, they ini-
tially sided with beef interests in opposition to
a common U.S.–Canadian animal ID policy,
established an ineffective voluntary animal ID
program, opposed House of Representatives’
leadership in support of a mandatory animal ID
position, and then chose an ineffectivestate-run
option.
Public Good, Free Riders, and
Market Failure
Clearly, animal ID qualifies as a public good,
which was defined by Samuelson (1954) as
‘‘...[goods] which all enjoy in common in the
sense that each individual’s consumption of such
a good leads to no subtractions from any other
individual’s consumption of that good...’’ Vol-
untary animal ID systems have not worked be-
causetheachievementofbenefits(diseasecontrol
and/or eradication) depends on everyone partici-
pating. Therefore, this is a classic case of market
failure in which individual rational decision-
making does not achieve efficient results either
in allocative or distributive terms.
Second Best
Equally important, experience and logical rea-
soning indicate that there is no second-best
solution when it comes to animal ID. For pests
such as the Mediterranean fruit fly, control is
a rational second-best policy option because of
cost and eradication feasibility considerations.
This is not the case for animal diseases such as
bovine tuberculosis, brucellosis, bovine spon-
giform encephalopathy (BSE), swine fever, or
avian influenza in which eradication is an ef-
fective option endorsed by the World Organi-
zation for Animal Health (OIE, 2010).
Culture
As used here, culture refers to a shared set of
attitudes, values, goals, and practices that char-
acterize a group of individuals. The individuals
discussed here are those who raise cattle, be-
causetheyaretheprimaryobstacletoachieving
an effective North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA)-wide animal ID policy.
Property Rights
One of the strongest values held by farmers, at
least in the U.S., appears to involve the rights to
private property.Thisisparticularlythecasefor
beef cattle raisers. Private property rights in-
clude1)controloftheuseoftheproperty;2)the
right to any benefit from the property; 3) a right
to transfer or sell the property; and 4) a right to
exclude others from the property. Smith (1776)
made private property rights central to capital-
ism in that these rights encourage their holders
to develop the property, generate wealth, and
efficiently allocate resources based on the op-
eration of markets.
Individualism and Market Justice
Friedman (1962) expanded on private property
rights by arguing that people are entitled to the
benefits of their individual efforts as they oper-
ate in a capitalistic, free-market environment
that is unencumbered by government regula-
tion. Animal ID is viewed by beef cattle raisers
asgovernmentregulationdesignedtolimittheir
individual efforts and their success as entrepre-
neurs in maximizing profits to build wealth. In
other words, they are opposed to governmental
paternalism interfering against their will while
thegovernment claims that cattle raisers will be
better off and protected from harm.
Egalitarianism
Egalitarian principles of equal economic, politi-
cal, and social status are substantially different
among cattlemen in Mexico in particular than in
eithertheU.S.orCanada.Thesedifferencesmay
arise from the land grants provided during the
colonial period of Latin America, a vestige of
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colonial system can also be identified in parts
of Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California,
settlementpoliciesintheU.S.wereverydifferent
(Knutson, Penn, and Flinchbaugh, 1998). In ad-
dition to the Homestead Act distributing rela-
tively small parcels of land at little or no cost to
would-be farmers, land grant colleges, agricul-
tural experiment stations, and extension services
were established to provide educational service
that allowed these farmers to become efficient
competitors in a system based on capitalistic de-
mocracy(Rasmussen,1962;Bowers,Rasmussen,
and Baker, 1984). Canada developed similar
smaller farmer agricultural systems.
There were at least two important results
of these policy and structural differences: 1) an
elite class of cattle raisers developed in Mexico
that continues to have a dominant influence and
controls policies affecting ranching. Although
similar structures can be identified for ranching
in parts of the U.S. western states, the overall
structure is considerably more decentralized
with less class influence; 2) the northern border
statesofMexicohavebeenmoreaggressivethan
Mexico Ministry of Agriculture (SAGARPA) in
developing animal ID systems because their
feeder cattle market is export-dependent, as
explained by Peel and Ortega.
U.S. Politics
Anderson effectively traces the political forces
influencing the evolution of animal ID U.S.
programs. This perspective is by stakeholder
group.
Dairy
U.S. milk producers support animal ID for a va-
riety of reasons. Milk is a carrier of a number of
zoonosis pathogens, which dairy farmers have
worked hard to eradicate. Mandatory animal ID
is viewed as an important step in achieving
eradication of diseases such as bovine tubercu-
losis and brucellosis across the U.S. In addition,
as noted previously, large U.S. dairies typically
have a higher cull rate and have become de-
pendentonimportsofdairyheifersandspringers
from Canada to replenish the U.S. milking herd.
Animal ID is seen as an aid to keeping markets
open. A smaller number of leading purebred
producers desire to freely export cattle.
Cattle Feeders and Meat Packers
Cattle feeding and meat packing is a big busi-
ness that depends on volume for efficiency.
Feeders have depended on a regular supply of
feeder cattle from both Mexico and Canada.
Those nearer the borders are more dependent;
and interruptions of supply such as caused by
the BSE incident created an important supply
issue for U.S. feeders and packers. However,
certainly, these problems were not nearly as big
as for Canadian feeders.
R-CALF
R-CALFhasbecomeafast-growingandleading
force in opposition to animal ID, in opposition
to increased concentration in the beef industry,
and in support of COOL. Three key positions
are related to animal ID: 1) general opposition
to any form of mandatory or voluntary animal
ID on domestically born and raised cattle; 2)
requireallimportedlivestocktobepermanently
marked with a mark of origin to aid in foreign
animaldiseasetracebacksafterimportation;and
3) require that imported cattle be physically
segmented from U.S.-born and raised cattle. R-
CALF can legitimately be classified as a popu-
list organization.
Other Cattle-Raising Organizations
A host of other cattle-raising organizations
compete directly with R-CALF for members.
The cattle-raising members of these organiza-
tions havemixed emotions about animal ID and
are not as likely to take a position and are even
less likely to come out in public on the issue.
On the one hand, they realize that their market
for cattle is with feeders and that it is in the
greater industryinterest that theyget alongwith
both feeders and packers. On the other hand,
they not only compete for membership with R-
CALF, but their members have some of the
same cultural characteristics as the R-CALF
members.
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Thegeneralfarmorganizations,mainlytheFarm
Bureau and Farmers Union, might have played
a political leadership role in bridging the gap
between R-CALF and the other cattle-raising
organizations. However, neither organization
appeared to realize the economic consequences
for trade of not adopting an effective animal ID
system. This may be explained by the fact that
the Farmers Union has never been a freer trade-
promoting organization and even the Farm Bu-




2010 U.S. Animal ID Developments
Anderson has discussed the post-NAIS 2010
USDA initiative for animal ID (APHIS, 2010),
which is clearly a step backward. As Carlberg
notes, the Canadian program is successful be-
cause the provinces build on a strong manda-
tory federal policy/program framework. The
2010 U.S. animal ID policy/program is built
on an APHIS/USDA framework developed by
voluntary ‘‘State-by-State and Tribe-by-Tribe
animal traceability efforts.’’ Clearly, this, like
previous USDA animal ID efforts, is a waste of
time and taxpayer money. It is doomed to fail-
ure from the get-go.
Concluding Remarks
The unfortunate conclusion of this analysis is
thatitwilllikelytakeaBSE-typeissuecentered
in the U.S. for a mandatory U.S. animal ID
program to become a reality.Both a Republican
and a Democrat administration have dropped
the ball in failing to recognize the public good
dimensions of this issue as it affects the health
and economic well-being of both producers and
consumers. Just and Peterson (2010), in the
January 2010 issue of the American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, conclude that tradi-
tional economic explanations for behavior do
not always explain how individuals respond to
risk. This certainly applies to the U.S. livestock
industry.
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